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earnings either omit schooling or treat it as exogenous. In a more general setting that also 
allows for the treatment of schooling as endogenous, we estimate the veteran effect for men 
who were born between 1944 and 1952 and thus reached draft age during the Vietnam era. 
We apply a variety of state-of-the-art econometric techniques to gauge the sensitivity of the 
estimates to the treatment of schooling. We find a significant veteran penalty. 
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I.   Introduction 
The costs of war include veterans’ foregone civilian human capital and labor market 
experience as well as the health effects due to exposure to combat (Oi, 1967; Stiglitz and Bilmes, 
2008).  Estimates of the effect of military service on subsequent civilian earnings vary widely, 
ranging from negative 10 percent to positive 25 percent.  A central issue in the literature is the 
endogeneity of military service.  Young men choose whether or not to volunteer.  Even during the 
Vietnam era that we study, many young men availed themselves of a variety of opportunities to 
avoid the draft. 
  Instrumental variables (IV) can correct for the endogeneity-bias in the estimates of veteran 
effect.  The challenge is finding an instrument for military service.  Angrist (1989, 1990, 1991) and 
Angrist and Chen (2008) show that the randomization of the Vietnam era draft provides a suitable 
instrument.   
A second issue is the treatment of schooling.  Most models of the veteran effect either omit 
schooling or treat it as exogenous.    Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) point out that the interpretation 
of the estimates depends on whether schooling as well as veteran status are endogenous with respect 
to the lottery.  The objective of this paper is to treat schooling as well as military service as 
endogenous and gauge the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative treatments of schooling 
commonly found in the literature.  Following Card (1995) we use the presence of four-year 
accredited public and private colleges in the vicinity of the respondent’s residence as instruments for 
schooling.  
Our sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) is smaller than the 
Census samples used in recent IV work.  This reduces the precision of the estimates. The issue is 
compounded by the fact that our close attention towards the exogeneity of instruments also led to the   3
choice of instruments that are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors and thus 
reducing the precision of the estimates further.  Nevertheless, we are still able to conclude that the 
veteran effect is negative.  The effect is even more negative once we control for the individual’s 
schooling and focus on the veteran effect net of schooling. 
To help address the concern of misleading inference from the standard procedures due to the 
presence of the “weak instruments”, we apply various weak instrument robust methods of inference 
and support our conclusions.  We use only the plug-in-based robust methods of inference on subsets 
of structural coefficients (associated with the endogenous regressors) because these methods are 
more powerful than their projection-based counterparts.  The plug-in-based methods were recently 
proposed by Stock and Wright (2000) and Kleibergen (2004, 2005), and are still not routinely used 
by applied researchers.
3  A secondary objective of the present paper is to demonstrate the usefulness 
of these methods to validate conclusions from the standard procedures, if not use them as standards.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides background on the 
literature on the veteran effect and returns to schooling.  Section III outlines the empirical analysis.  
The data are described in Section IV, and Section V presents the results.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  Background 
The Veteran Effect:  Premium or Penalty? 
  It is unclear a priori whether military service increases or decreases earnings.  On one hand, 
there are opportunities for human capital acquisition, which, for many, would not otherwise be 
                                                 
3  Kleibergen (2007) and Kleibergen and Mavroeidis (2008a) prove that these methods do not ever over-reject the true 
value of the structural coefficients. To the best of our knowledge, these methods have, since then, found applications 
only in the literature on the new Keynesian Phillips curve (see, for example, Kleibergen and Mavroeidis, 2008b).       4
available.  The military provides on-the-job training and college education is subsidized in-service 
and within service, and post-service through GI Bills.
4        
  Servicemen gain less measureable forms of human capital as well.  For instance, the military 
serves as a “bridging environment” in which youths from disadvantaged backgrounds can learn less-
observable skills such as an ability to function in a structured environment (Teachman and Call, 
1996).  Successful completion of a term of service signals favorable pre-market ability and acquired 
unobservable skills (DeTray, 1982).   Taken together, these factors suggest that veterans will receive 
a premium when they return to the civilian sector. 
  Yet military service entails costs as well as benefits.  Draftees are drawn off their otherwise 
optimal human capital investment paths.  So are young men who enlist in order to preempt being 
drafted into the infantry and those enlisting for non-financial motives such as patriotism or family 
tradition.  Soldiers exposed to combat experience adverse physical and mental consequences.   It is 
unclear whether, on net, military service increases or decreases earnings. 
  Estimates of the effect of military service vary by factors such as age, era, and approach to 
estimation.  Early estimates are based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  Rosen and Taubman 
(1982) suggest a premium of 10 percent for World War II veterans and a penalty of 19 percent for 
Vietnam era veterans.  There appears to be no effect of military service on the earnings of Korean 
War veterans (Schwartz, 1986).   Other OLS-type studies report estimates that vary by service, rank 
and military occupational specialty.  Air force veterans tend to earn more than veterans of other 
services (MacLean and Elder, 2007).  Officers tend to fare better than enlisted personnel (MacLean, 
2008).  Technical skills transfer more readily to the civilian sector (Bryant and Wilhite, 1990; 
Goldberg and Warner, 1987).  Blacks achieve greater premia and suffer smaller penalties than 
                                                 
4 Rostker (2006) outlines programs available from 1973 to 2004.  New programs continue to be introduced.  The best 
references on current offerings are the services’ recruiting web pages.     5
whites (Bryant, Samaranayake and Wilhite, 1993; Teachman and Tedrow, 2004.  Costs of service 
are greatest for draftees and soldiers exposed to combat (Teachman, 2004; MacLean and Elder 
2007). 
  Estimating the effect of military service on earnings poses an empirical challenge.   As Rosen 
and Taubman note, military service is endogenous.  The direction of the bias in the OLS estimate is 
ambiguous.  On one hand, youths with better opportunities in the civilian sector will tend to opt out 
of the military.  On the other hand, those with sufficiently low physical or cognitive ability will not 
qualify.  Another source of endogeneity is the measurement error in veteran status, and this tends to 
bias the OLS estimates towards zero. 
  Instrumental variables estimates allow researchers to overcome the problem of endogeneity 
and obtain causal estimates of the veteran effect.  Several studies exploit the randomness of draft 
lotteries as a valid instrument.  Angrist and Krueger (1994) report premia ranging from 6 to 25 
percent for World War II veterans.  Angrist (1989, 1990) finds a Vietnam era penalty of 15 percent 
for whites, but no effect for blacks.  These studies suggest that OLS estimates of the gains from 
service during World War II and the losses due to service during the Vietnam era are both biased 
away from zero.  Angrist and Chen (2008) estimate long-run effects by capturing Vietnam era 
youths until 2000. They find that the Vietnam veteran penalty dissipates as men approach the 
overtaking point, where earnings profiles flatten (Mincer 1974). 
Military Service and Schooling: 
  The interpretation of all these estimates hinges on the treatment of schooling in the 
estimating equation.  There is an extensive literature on the returns to schooling emphasizing the fact 
that schooling is endogenous with respect to unobserved ability (see Card, 1999 for a survey).   
Those with more favorable labor market unobservables obtain more schooling, leading to an upward   6
bias in the OLS estimates of the returns to schooling.  On the other hand, measurement error in 
schooling will bias estimates downward.  A variety of IV approaches have been used to generate 
(asymptotically) unbiased estimates.  The literature generally reports IV estimates exceeding 
comparable OLS estimates.  There are several reasons to think that military service is related to 
schooling.  First, the college tuition subsidies provide an incentive for continued schooling.   Second, 
during the Vietnam era, potential draftees could defer their obligations by remaining in school.  Card 
and Lemieux (2001) show that young men reaching draft age at the height of the draft were more 
likely to remain in college.  Third, those with disabilities may be less capable of returning to school, 
and finally, the unconstrained optimal level of schooling may exceed the optimal level subject to the 
constraint of service or draft eligibility.  Angrist and Chen’s (2008) Vietnam era veteran premium 
several decades beyond the military service is attributable to the additional education subsidized by 
the GI Bill. 
  The joint endogeneity of schooling and military service has implications for the estimates of 
the veteran effect.  When both are treated as exogenous, OLS estimates will be biased. When both 
are treated as endogenous, IV estimates with sufficiently large samples and appropriate instruments 
will be unbiased.  When only veteran status is treated as endogenous, and schooling and veteran 
status are correlated, bias in the estimate of the returns to schooling can spread to the estimate of the 
veteran effect (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000).  When schooling is omitted, the veteran effect is 
interpreted as gross of the effect of military service on schooling.  
Our approach allows us to assess the sensitivity of estimates of the veteran effect to 
alternative treatments of schooling.  As in Angrist (1989), we use data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLS-YM) of men who were draft age during the Vietnam era.  
Our instrumental variables can be broadly classified under two categories – (i) variables describing   7
the draft eligibility of respondents and (ii) variables indicating the presence of an accredited four 
years college in the vicinity of the respondents’ residence.  Angrist (1989, 1990) and Angrist and 
Chen (2008) instrument for military service with draft lottery parameters.  Card (1995), using the 
NLS-YM, instruments for schooling with presence of college.  Our sample is small relative to recent 
IV studies of the veteran effect and returns to schooling and estimates and specification tests can be 
sensitive to the presence of weak instruments.  Therefore, we apply a variety of state-of-the-art 
approaches to gauge the properties of the instrumental variables estimators. 
 
III.  Estimation  
Empirical Model: 
We consider the following model to estimate the net effect of a man’s veteran status on his 
wage in the civilian market (later in his life cycle), after controlling for his years of schooling and 
other background characteristics.  Let  
   =     +     +     +                                     (1) 
where    is the logarithm of the real wage for the i-th man in the civilian labor market,    (=1) is a 
dummy variable indicating whether he ever served in the military,    is his years of schooling, and 
   contains an intercept term and a set of background variables including his demographic, 
household and locational characteristics.  The error term    includes the unobservable human capital 
and the ability of the i-th man.   
We are primarily interested in the coefficient  .  For small values of  , this coefficient 
measures the net percent change in real wage attributable to veteran status, after controlling for years 
of schooling and other background characteristics.  However, as pointed out by Halverson and 
Palmquist (1981), for not so small values of   the appropriate measure should be   = (   −  1).    8
Our estimates for   are not small and hence we also report estimates for  .  The coefficient   
measures the net returns to schooling, after controlling for the veteran status and other background 
characteristics, and is interesting in its own right. 
The main challenges in conducting inference on   are the endogeneity of    and    and the 
possible non-zero correlation between them.  In Section II we discussed why   ,    and     are 
potentially mutually correlated.  The return to schooling literature suggests that schooling is 
positively correlated with unobserved characteristics that affect wages positively.  At the same time, 
evidence of measurement error in schooling data is common in the literature.  
The correlation between schooling and veteran status is also ambiguous a priori.  In our 
sample, empirically, veterans have slightly more schooling than the non veterans.  A closer look 
reveals that of the 1080 veterans included in our sample, more than  61.5 percent went for additional 
schooling since their first (or only) term with the armed forces; and on average they got about 1.32 
additional years of schooling.  While it does not necessarily establish a causal effect of one’s veteran 
status on schooling, this certainly calls for a thorough inspection of the treatment of schooling in the 
specification described by (1).  We address this issue further in Section V while discussing our 
results.    
Evaluating the Instrumental Variables Estimates: 
Likely endogeneity of veteran status and schooling and evidence of correlation between these 
variables suggest that simple OLS methods cannot consistently estimate the net effect of veteran 
status.  IV is the most common method of inference in these situations.  A necessary condition for 
consistency of the IV estimators is that the instruments used for the two endogenous regressors are 
exogenous which, in turn, implies that the variation induced by the instruments in the endogenous 
regressors is uncorrelated with the unobserved structural error  .  Unfortunately, it is not possible to   9
test exogeneity of the instruments without the prior assumption that the model is overidentified, i.e., 
there are at least three instruments, and at least two independent linear combinations of these 
instruments are exogenous.  We try to overcome this limitation of the test of exogeneity of the 
instruments by considering various alternative specifications while testing exogeneity (reported in 
Table 3 of the appendix and discussed in Section V).  
However, the close attention to exogeneity also leads us to be conservative in the choice of 
instruments and restricts us from capturing some variations in the endogenous explanatory variables 
veteran status and schooling.  Ideally asymptotic efficiency of the inference should be the only virtue 
at stake here.  However, as Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) emphasize, this could also give rise to 
the so-called “weak instrument problems” in the usual asymptotic methods of inference based on the 
two-stage least squares (TSLS) framework.  In such cases, TSLS estimates can be inconsistent and 
asymptotically biased, and the usual t-test and F-test tend to over-reject the true value of the 
parameters.  These problems do not go away even with relatively large sample size.  Hence, given 
the small number of observations in our sample, such problems are likely to be a major concern.
5 
To overcome such problems we also consider the recently proposed “weak instrument 
robust” methods of inference.  The broader aspects of our conclusion remain unchanged.  The weak 
instrument robust methods provide a way for testing the parameters of interest, and then 
subsequently inverting the tests to obtain confidence regions for the parameters.  Unlike the usual t-
test and F-test, these tests are not over-sized even in finite samples (as long as the instruments are 
exogenous) and hence the asymptotic coverage probability of the corresponding confidence regions 
                                                 
5 It is important to distinguish between the two types of problems that can arise due to weak instruments. The first 
problem is a reduction in precision; this is natural because the data do not contain enough information to precisely 
identify the parameters in the model. The second problem is the so-called “weak instrument problem” and this refers to 
the case where the conventional first-order asymptotic results provide poor approximation to the finite sample behavior 
of the estimators and tests; namely, the usual estimates tend to precisely report wrong values of the parameters and the 
usual tests tend to over-reject the true value of the parameters. Weak instrument robust methods were developed to 
address the second problem and overcome such misleadingly spurious precision in the usual methods of inference.       10
does not exceed their nominal counterparts.  We use the subset AR test, the subset K test and the 
subset KJ test (see, for example, Kleibergen, 2004, 2007; Kleibergen and Mavroeidis, 2008a) to deal 
with the potential problem of weak instruments.  These methods are based on the plug-in principle 
and are more powerful than their projection-based counterparts (see Chaudhuri, 2008).  Although 
these methods can be conservative in finite samples; unlike the conventional methods, they do not, 
however, report incorrect parameter values with spuriously high precision or over-reject the true 
parameter value in the presence of weak instruments. 
Estimation Framework: 
We use the generalized method of moments (GMM) to infer on the parameters   and   in 
(1). The moment restrictions for the inference are based on the following four instruments – (i) the 
lottery number assigned to the young man based on his date of birth, (ii) the lottery ceiling for the 
year when this young man attained draft age, (iii) a dummy variable indicating the presence of a four 
year accredited public college and (ii) a dummy variable indicating the presence of a four year 
accredited private college in the neighborhood of the young man’s residence in 1966.  Denoting 
these four instruments generically by     and letting    = [   ,  ], the assumption of exogeneity of 
the instruments and the background variables gives the moment restrictions (at the true value of the 
parameters) 
 [  
 (   −     −     −    )] = 0 for all   = 1,…, .                       (2) 
We report the results of inference from the usual two-stage least squares methods based on the 
moment restrictions in (2).  We also report the results of weak instrument robust inference from the 
Continuous Updating GMM based on the same set of moment restrictions.  The results are discussed 
in Section V.   
   11
IV.  Data 
  We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLS-YM) to estimate 
the parameters in (1).  The NLS-YM is a nationally representative data set of young men aged 14–24 
in 1966.   Respondents were followed annually until 1971, and then annually or biennially until 
1981.    
   Men born between 1944 and 1952, who constitute about 82 percent of the entire sample, 
were subject to the annual lotteries from 1969 through 1972.  These men are the subject of our study.  
Veteran status is captured in two ways.  First, there are a number of specific questions about military 
service.  Second, the data indicate whether a respondent was unavailable because he was currently 
serving in the military. Schooling is measured as the highest grade completed reported on the survey.   
The dependent variable, real hourly earnings, is measured in 1981 dollars at the oldest age at 
which the respondent appeared on the survey.  In order to capture the effect of veteran status (and 
schooling) as late as possible in the man’s life-cycle, we further restrict our attention to men whose 
last recorded wage was earned at the age of 29 or more.
6  Ignoring the 1.69 percent respondents with 
missing wage figures, 65.75 percent of men interviewed in the survey earned their last wage at age 
29 or more.
7  Lastly we ignore one respondent with an implausible birthday (04/31/1949) and three 
respondents with missing information on the type of area (urbanized, urban place or rural) of the 
respondent’s residence in 1966.  Our final sample consists of 2754 respondents. 
     In all, 1080, or 39 percent of the final sample, were veterans and 1674 were non-veterans. 
Sample size and reporting issues preclude us from disaggregating by rank, service or military 
occupation.  Highest year of schooling completed was, on average, slightly higher for veterans 
(13.6) than non-veterans (13.4).  However, the partial correlations of veteran status and schooling, 
                                                 
6 Among all the respondents born between 1944 and 1952, the wage figures are missing for 66 men and 6 reported 0 
wage. 
7 60.39 percent satisfies the stricter criterion of last recorded wage being earned at age 30 or more.    12
controlling for the set of regressors used in the analysis is negative.  These controls include race, 
region,
8 urbanicity
9 and the age and year at which the wage was earned.   
  The NLS-YM provides suitable instruments for both veteran status and schooling.  Following 
Angrist (1989, 1990) and Angrist and Chen (2008) we use dimensions of draft status to instrument 
for military service; in particular we use the lottery number assigned to the individuals born between 
1944 and 1952 and we use the ceiling of the draft-lottery announced for the year the individual 
became draft eligible.  Following Card (1999), variables indicating the presence of four year 
accredited public and private colleges are used to instrument for schooling. 
  The full set of sample statistics is reported in Table 1. 
 
V.  Results  
  In order to illustrate the sensitivity of the results to different treatments of schooling and 
treatment of potentially endogenous variables we compare five specifications of the relationship 
described in (1).  The results are reported in Table 2.  Corresponding results (estimates and standard 
errors) for the control variables are reported in Table 2(a). 
  The most general specification includes both schooling and veteran status and treats both as 
endogenous.  The IV results, reported in column (A), indicate a large veteran penalty.  The 
coefficient γ of -.374 corresponds to a veteran effect of -31.2 percent (δ = e  − 1).  The standard 
error of this estimate is rather large, around 15 percent (obtained by the Delta method); and a 95 
percent confidence region suggests that the wage reduction for veterans can vary from 1 percent to 
61 percent.  Nevertheless, we can safely reject that the net veteran premium is zero (or positive).  
                                                 
8 The regions are northeast, mid-atlantic, east north central, west north central/mountain, east south central, west south 
central,  pacific; and south atlantic as a default. 
9 The area is categorized as urbanized if its population is more than 125,000, as an urban place if the population is 
between 12,000 and 125,000, and rural otherwise.   13
The estimate of the returns to schooling of 16.1 percent (p-value = .078) is comparable to Card’s 
(1995). 
  We find that both veteran status and schooling are endogenous (p-value =.031 for veteran 
status alone, .082 for schooling alone, and .055 for veteran status and schooling jointly).  The test is 
based on a C-statistic defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the 
regression treating the suspected regressor(s) as exogenous, and the other treating it (them) as 
endogenous. 
  Military service impacts earnings both directly, through, say, skill acquisition and indirectly 
through its association with schooling.  The estimate of the veteran effect from column (A) is 
interpreted as the direct effect of military service, net of the indirect effect through schooling.  In 
specification (B) we omit schooling to obtain an estimate of the gross veteran effect.  This estimate 
captures the direct effect as well as the indirect effect operating through schooling, for instance 
through the GI bill which is available only to veterans.    
  The estimate of the gross veteran effect -15.8 percent (p-value =.14) is greater than the 
estimate of the net effect, consistent with the case in which the returns to schooling are positive and 
schooling and veteran status are positively correlated.   Although the standard errors of the veteran 
effect are similar in the two specifications, because the point estimate of the gross effect is closer to 
zero we cannot reject that the gross effect is different from zero.  In this specification, we are also 
unable to reject the hypothesis that veteran status is exogenous (p-value = .244).   
  Specifications (C) and (D) are the OLS analogs to specifications (A) and (B).  We would 
expect that, for the Vietnam era, veteran status will be negatively correlated with the earnings 
equation unobservables, biasing the OLS estimate downward.  We would also expect the returns to 
schooling to be positively correlated with those unobservables, biasing the OLS coefficient upward.    14
Instead, we find the opposite:  The OLS estimate of the veteran effect is greater (i.e., more positive) 
than the IV estimate and the OLS estimate of the returns to schooling is smaller than the IV estimate. 
The estimate of the returns to schooling when schooling is treated as exogenous in Specifications (C) 
and (E) is 4.9 percent (p-value = .003) and is about 1.5 percentage points lower than Card’s (1995).   
  The endogeneity tests indicate that both schooling and veteran status are endogenous.  But 
are the OLS estimates significantly different from the IV estimates?  In terms of Specification (A), 
estimate of the net effect, the IV estimates indicate that both schooling and veteran status are 
endogenous.   However, using the Hausman test we cannot reject that the difference between the 
probability limits of the IV and OLS estimates are significant (p-value =.158).
10  In other words, 
while the endogeneity tests indicate that OLS is misspecified we cannot say whether the 
misspecification is sufficient to generate a “significant” asymptotic bias.  Of course, this may be due 
to lack of precision. 
  Many studies of the veteran effect control for schooling but do not have data to instrument 
for it.  Specification (E) is that model.  The point estimate of the veteran effect, - 20.9 percent, lies 
between the IV estimates of the gross and net effect of veteran status.  The estimate lacks precision 
and is not statistically significant.  Again, although the test of endogeneity indicates that model (E) is 
misspecficied our estimates are not sufficiently precise to reject no misspecification-bias of the OLS 
estimate (p-value = 0.34).  
Are these results impacted by weak instrument issues?  
  Yes. The first stage F-statistics for testing the relevance of the (excluded) instruments are 
low:  8.46 for veteran status and 2.53 for schooling. The partial     statistics are .012 and .004 
respectively for the two endogenous regressors (see Shea, 1997).  Hence there is evidence that the 
                                                 
10 To see if the conclusion from the Hausman test is affected by the presence of weak instruments, we use all three forms 
of the statistic described in equation 3.9 (page 568) of Staiger and Stock (1997). The conclusion does not change with 
the other forms of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic.   15
instruments do not explain much variation of the endogenous regressors, especially schooling.
11  A 
more systematic test for weak instruments is the test proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005).  This test 
suggests that given our model and the exogenous instruments, the maximum (asymptotic) bias of the 
TSLS estimators of    and   , relative to their OLS estimators is more than 30 percent.  If the 
instruments were strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors, one would expect this to be 
close to 0.  The test by Stock and Yogo also suggests that the nominal size of 5 percent Wald test for 
jointly testing the significance of veteran status and schooling is likely to be more than 25 percent.  
Again, if the instruments were strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors, this would be 
close to 5 percent.  
  To gauge how seriously these problems affect our overall results, we followed the recently 
proposed weak-instrument-robust methods of inference.  These methods are valid as long as the 
instruments are exogenous.  
Are the instruments exogenous?  
It is reassuring to observe that the over-identification test cannot reject the exogeneity of the 
instruments even at 97 percent level. This should be hardly surprising since we ended up with weak 
instruments in the first place because we were too careful to ensure the exogeneity of the 
instruments.  More information on the Sargan-Hansen C-test for testing exogeneity of the individual 
instruments under various instrument specifications is provided in Table 3. 
We can also justify the exogeneity of the instruments intuitively. The lottery number 
assigned to each man was based on his date of birth and hence can be argued to be uncorrelated with 
unobserved individual characteristics (see Angrist, 1989).  Similarly one could argue that the lottery 
ceiling for the draft years were also determined independently of the individuals unobserved 
characteristics.  It is, however, less straightforward to intuitively justify the exogeneity of the other 
                                                 
11 The Anderson LM statistic, however, rejects the hypothesis of under-identification in the model at 5.5 percent level.   16
instruments, based on the presence of  four year accredited colleges in the vicinity of the 
respondent’s residence in 1966 (see Card, 1995 for an elaborate discussion).  Nevertheless, given 
that the exogeneity of lottery number and lottery ceiling is more convincing, in Table 3 we have 
tested the exogeneity of the variables indicating the presence of colleges (individually and jointly) 
under the assumption that the variables involving lottery are exogenous.  The minimum p-value for 
the over-identification test is 84 percent; and for the specification (A), that we actually use, the p-
value is more than 97 percent.  Hence, we can strongly argue that the instruments used in the IV 
regression are exogenous.
12  
Results from weak-instrument-robust methods of inference: 
Weak-instrument robust methods – the subset AR test and the subset K test are used to test different 
hypothesized values of the parameters  and  .  These tests are inverted to obtain confidence regions 
for the parameters.  The confidence regions are the collection of hypothesized values of the 
parameters that cannot be rejected by the weak instrument robust tests.  Due to presence of weak 
instruments, these confidence regions are very wide (given a set of instruments, this problem is 
unavoidable).  In fact, the regions obtained by inverting the subset AR test are unbounded.  The 
regions obtained by inverting the subset K test are considerably more precise than those obtained 
from the subset AR test.  However, as pointed out by Kleibergen (2004), the confidence regions 
based on the K test can spuriously contain non-representative value due to a peculiarity in the 
properties of the K statistic. Methods to deal with this unintuitive (and unhelpful) property of the K 
test have been suggested in the literature (see Kleibergen, 2004, 2007; Kleibergen and Mavroeidis, 
2008a, 2008b; Chaudhuri, 2008). One such method, the subset KJ test, is also used to obtain 
                                                 
12 We also use the    (for columns 1 and 2 of Table 3) and the   statistics (for all the columns) described in Hahn, Ham 
and Moon (2008) to test for exogeneity of the instruments. The p-value for all these tests exceeds 95 percent and hence 
strongly supports the exogeneity hypothesis. The results are not reported here because the weighting matrix of the 
quadratic form is near-singular in all cases and there may be some concern with the ill-conditioned computations.   17
confidence regions in Figure 1 (and 1(b)); and the following discussion is based on these regions.  
(All the confidence regions based on these weak instrument robust methods are plotted in Figure 1.) 
  A 95 percent confidence region for   can vary from -1 percent to -121 percent, and hence the 
net veteran effect can vary from a wage reduction of 1 percent to 70 percent (obtained by 
projection).  Of course, this is very imprecise.  However, it is also interesting to note that, even with 
such degree of imprecision, we can reject a zero or positive net effect of veteran status.  A 95 percent 
confidence region for   shows that the increase in wage due to an additional year of schooling can 
vary from 3.5 percent to 54.5 percent.   
  It is also reassuring to note that the TSLS estimates (that are not supposed to be robust to 
weak instruments) are also included inside these robust confidence regions, showing that our main 
results based on TSLS are not terribly misleading in this context. 
 
VI.  Conclusion   
  Estimates of the effect of military service vary by era, age and methodology.  We focus on 
the third issue using a sample of relatively young veterans of the Vietnam era.  Two methodological 
issues are the joint endogeneity of both military service and schooling, and the potential weakness of 
the instruments.  The sample size (N=2754) is also relatively small for microeconometric research 
and results in lower precision than we would like.  
Point estimates suggest a veteran penalty of about 20.9 percent when schooling is treated as 
exogenous and 31.2 percent when schooling is treated as endogenous. OLS estimates are positive 
and small.  The IV estimate of the effect of military service, gross of schooling, is -15.8 percent. 
Rosenzwieg and Wolpin’s (2000) point that schooling is endogenous is validated; but, in our sample, 
it does not seem to cause a "statistically significant" bias in the estimate of veteran effect.    18
  Still, our result has a substantive implication.  Approximately 9-10 years after Vietnam era 
service, veterans suffer significant penalty. 
The exercise is the first application of many new techniques for evaluating properties of 
instrumental variables estimators and dealing with weak instruments.  The focus on a model with 
two endogenous variables and the use of a cross-section microeconometric data set are also novel.  
We hope this paper will provide a guide for other researchers applying the state-of-the art 
approaches to instrumental variables models.    19
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Mean 
(s.d.) 
  Overall  Veterans  Not Veterans 






Veteran (proportion)  .392 
(.488) 
-  - 






















































Residence at the age of 14 (South-Atlantic is omitted category) 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (continued)   
Variables  Mean 
(s.d.) 
 
Overall  Veterans  Not Veterans 




























Proportion with at least one  4 year accredited college in the neighborhood  












Total Number of 
Observations   2754  1080  1674   24
Table 2: Regression Results from Equation (1)  
13 
  Specifications 
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
Method of estimation  IV  IV  OLS  OLS  IV 
Veteran is treated as  endogenous  endogenous  exogenous  exogenous  endogenous 
Schooling is treated as  endogenous  excluded  exogenous  excluded  exogenous 
Veteran 
Coefficient:       























Schooling  .161** 
(.078)  -  .049*** 
(.003)  -  .049*** 
(.003) 
Sargan-statistic  








For Veteran  4.639 
(.0312) 
1.360 
(.244)  -  -  2.573 
(.109) 
For Schooling  3.019 

















(.358)  -  -  -  - 
Anderson LM statistic  




(.000)  -  -  33.687 
(.000) 

































Statistics  1.894  8.464  -  -  8.47 






10% - 20%  -  -  between 
10% - 20% 





20% - 25%  -  -  between 
20% - 25% 
 
                                                 
13Results are based on 2754 observations.  Rows corresponding to the coefficients contain the standard errors within 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.  Rows 
corresponding to the test of over and under identifications contain the p-values within parentheses.   25
 
Table 2(a): Regression Results from Equation (1)  
14 
  Specifications 
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
Method of estimation  IV  IV  OLS  OLS  IV 
Veteran is treated as  endogenous  endogenous  exogenous  exogenous  endogenous 
Schooling is treated as  endogenous  excluded  exogenous  excluded  exogenous 















































































































































   
                                                 
14 Results are based on 2754 observations.  Standard errors are reported within parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. 
15 Had this been the variable of interest, once should use dummies to control for the years in which wage is earned to 
obtain practically meaningful coefficients.   26 
 




4 year public 
college 
4 year private 
college 
4 year public 
college 
4 year private 
college 
4 year public 

























Instruments used in 
the model 
1) 4 year public 
2) Lottery number 
3) Ceiling in Lottery 
1) 4 year private 
2) Lottery number 
3) Ceiling in Lottery 
1) 4 year public 
2) 4 year private 
3) Lottery number 
4) Ceiling in Lottery 
1) 4 year public 
2) 4 year private 
2) Lottery number 
3) Ceiling in Lottery 
1) 4 year public 
2) 4 year private 
3) Lottery number 
4) Ceiling in Lottery   27
Figure 1: 95 % Confidence Regions based on each test is the region below the horizontal red line 
















γ: Coefficient of Veteran
















β: Coefficient of Schooling








Figure 1(b): 95 % Confidence Regions based on each test is the region below the horizontal red line 















β: Coefficient of Schooling
Magnified Panel(b): Confidence region for β
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